[79] Annotation: Products liability: perfumes, colognes, or deodorants, 46 ALR4th 1197.

 

[80] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by food or food product sold, 77 ALR2d 7.

In Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc. (1991, 5th Dist) 212 Ill App 3d 296, 155 Ill Dec 508, 569 NE2d 1119, 14 UCCRS2d 736, app gr 139 Ill 2d 597, 159 Ill Dec 108, 575 NE2d 915 and affd 147 Ill 2d 408, 168 Ill Dec 147, 589 NE2d 547, 17 UCCRS2d 396, the court held that the fact that a pecan shell used in a chocolate-covered pecan-caramel candy which allegedly broke the plaintiff’s tooth was natural to pecans did not of itself bar a suit, as this was only one factor in determining if the defendant candy manufacturer breached its warranty or manufactured an unreasonably dangerous food product.

Plaintiff broke her tooth when she bit into a chocolate-covered, pecan-caramel candy. Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the foreign-natural substance rule (if a substance in a manufactured food product is natural to any of the ingredients of the product, there is no liability for injuries caused by the substance) and adopted the consumer’s reasonable expectation rule (if consumer gets injured by a substance he would not reasonably expect to find in a product, liability will lie with the food manufacturer). Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc. (1992) 147 Ill 2d 408, 168 Ill Dec 147, 589 NE2d 547, 17 UCCRS2d 396; see also Goodman v. Wenco Foods, Inc. (1992) 333 NC 1, 423 SE2d 444, 19 UCCRS2d 369.

Plaintiff could not maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when she became ill after discovering a dead insect on her fork while eating canned spinach. In so holding, the court reasoned the plaintiff must be able to show that the emotional distress is medically diagnosable and medically significant, although proof of contemporaneous physical injury is not required. Ford v. Aldi, Inc. (1992, Mo App) 832 SW2d 1, 18 UCCRS2d 1143.

Zone of danger rule in emotional distress action applied to negligence and breach of warranty claims when restaurant customer suffered emotional and physical injury after finding a worm in her food. Sowell v. Hyatt Corp. (1993, Dist Col App) 623 A2d 1221, 20 UCCRS2d 1232.

Parents could sustain a cause of action against a restaurant and its suppliers for the wrongful death of their 21-week-old viable fetus. Pregnant woman contracted toxoplasmosis from eating contaminated food. Fetus was aborted as a result of the contamination. Rottman v. Krabloonik, Inc. (1993, DC Colo) 834 F Supp 1269.

Plaintiff sustained permanent injury to his hand when a jar of peanuts shattered while he was replacing the cap. Plaintiff brought a product liability suit against the seller and manufacturer of the peanuts and the jar, claiming the jar was defective. Appeals Court overruled lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, claiming there existed an issue of fact as to what caused the defect in the jar. Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co. (1994, CA7 Ill) 17 F3d 209.

Plaintiff injured her tooth when she bit into a bone fragment that was in the ground beef she purchased at the market. Plaintiff sued the market for negligence, strict liability and breach of implied warranty. Ford v. Miller Meat Co. (1994, 4th Dist) 28 Cal App 4th 1196, 33 Cal Rptr 2d 899, 94 CDOS 7808, 94 Daily Journal DAR 13866, 24 UCCRS2d 860. The court found that plaintiff’s claim for negligence was without merit. Under the “reasonable expectation” test, it was reasonable to expect a bone fragment in ground beef. The court further found that plaintiff’s claims for strict liability and breach of implied warranty were also without merit. Under the “foreign v. natural substance” test, a bone fragment is considered a natural substance of ground beef.

[81] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by beverage sold, 77 ALR2d 215.

[82] Annotation: Products liability: alcoholic beverages, 42 ALR4th 253.

See also, Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (1986) 112 Idaho 277, 731 P2d 1267, cert den 486 US 1031, 100 L Ed 2d 601, 108 S Ct 2013 [judgment of $100,000 actual damages and $200,000 punitive damages for injury done to the eye of a woman opening a soft drink when the twist top cap blew off] cert den (US) 100 L Ed 2d 601, 108 S Ct 2013; Gonzales v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1984, La App 5th Cir) 459 So 2d 624 [damages awarded when bottle cap was propelled like a missile, causing injury]Sheehan v. New Hampshire Liquor Comm’n (1985) 126 NH 473, 493 A2d 494, 40 UCCRS 1665 [damages for exploding bottle]Bredberg v. PepsiCo (1996, Iowa) 551 NW2d 321 (court affirmed denial of defendant’s judgment nov, finding evidence to support jury finding that exploding glass soda bottle was unreasonably dangerous and defective.)

[83] McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp. (1991) 257 NJ Super 339, 608 A2d 447 [summary judgment denied to defendants; each food supplier had to come forward with evidence that it was not his product which caused the food poisoning.]

[84] Annotations: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by medical and health supplies, appliances, and equipment, 79 ALR2d 401.

Liability of hospital or medical practitioner under doctrine of strict liability in tort, or breach of warranty, for harm caused by drug, medical instrument, or similar device used in treating patient, 54 ALR3d 258.

As to the growing importance of generic drugs an understanding of the process for approval is found in <ntc ref.id=”I03HXTB”>Beers, Donald G., Generic Drugs: A Guide to F.D.A. Approval Requirements (Prentice Hall, 1988).

Cases adjudicating various medications are examined and summarized in <ntc ref.id=”I03HXZ5″>Patterson, Richard M. (ed.), Drugs in Litigation-Third Edition (The Michie Co., 1986).

Compare Shanks v. Upjohn Co. (1992, Alaska) 835 P2d 1189 (prescription drugs are not exempt from strict liability for design defects) with Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992, 4th Dist) 11 Cal App 4th 349, 13 Cal Rptr 2d 811, 92 CDOS 9633, 92 Daily Journal DAR 15999 (strict liability for design defects does not apply to prescription medical devices, i.e., IUD.)

FDA approval of a drug does not preempt state product liability claims against the drug manufacturer for design defect. Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 993 F.2d 528, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) &p;13478, 36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1338 (6th Cir. 1993).

California Supreme Court upheld its precedent that a strict liability standard be applied to prescription drug manufacturers for failure to warn of known or reasonably knowable risks. According to the Court, the defendant manufacturer failed to convince the court why the manufacturer should not be responsible for the cost of its own failure to provide adequate warnings. Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal 4th 1104, 56 Cal Rptr 2d 162, 920 P2d 1347, 56, 96 CDOS 6562, 96 Daily Journal DAR 10737 (patient sued manufacturer of Halcion for failing to warn of drug’s dangerous propensities.)

Court held unconstitutional a Michigan tort reform statute that limited the liability of drug manufacturers and sellers in product liability actions when the drug was approved for safety by the FDA and labeled in compliance with the FDA standards. Taylor v. Gate Pharmaceuticals, 248 Mich. App. 472, 639, 639 N.W.2d 45, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) &p;16207 (2001), appeal granted, 649 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 2002) and appeal granted, 649 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 2002) and appeal granted, 649 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 2002) and appeal granted, 649 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 2002).

[85] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

[86] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

[87] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

[88] Annotation: Products liability: diethylstilbestrol (DES), 2 ALR4th 1091.

In Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1990, App DC) 283 US App DC 41, 895 F2d 1463, the court held that a manufacturer of DES was not entitled to summary judgment in an action brought by a cancer victim when there was a factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff had been exposed to the drug while in utero.

[89] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

[90] Annotation: Medical malpractice: administering or prescribing drugs for weight control, 1 ALR4th 236.

While a weight-loss drug is clearly a “product,” it is unclear if a weight-loss book which gives incorrect and unhealthy advice could be treated as a product if a reader suffers injury following the advice provided in the book. The problem is an acute one because the recent proliferation of such self-help dieting books. The same issue is raised by the distribution of incorrect information in publications given out by weight-loss services, although those services which provide special foods to their clients are clearly involved in the marketing of a product.

In Smith v. Linn (1989) 386 Pa Super 392, 563 A2d 123, 16 Media L R 2228, app gr 525 Pa 603, 575 A2d 568 and affd 526 Pa 447, 587 A2d 309, the court held that the First Amendment protects the publisher of a diet book which allegedly contained negligent advice which in turn lead to the death of a reader against liability stemming from negligence, misrepresentation, strict liability or breach of warranty despite the fact that the book contains allegedly negligent advice.

In class action suit, court held that weight-loss clinic violated sections 5 and 12 of the FTCA when clinic made false representations and promises to attract consumers. FTC v. Pacific Medical Clinics Management, Inc. (1992, SD Cal) 1992 US Dist LEXIS 6247. “[T]hese consumers were promised a medically approved weight-loss program, and promised that a certain amount of weight would be lost. Not only did defendants fail to fulfill their promises regarding the level of weight loss, but even when consumers lost weight, such weight was attributable to the low-calorie diet which defendants encouraged consumers to follow rather than any medically-approved system.” Additionally, the court held that clinic’s “failure to disclose the absence of FDA approval of a drug’s safety and efficacy [was] false and deceptive … .”

See also <ntc ref.id=”I03JCZ6″>Holmes, Dying to Lose Weight: Hazardous Diets, 29 Trial Magazine 30 (August 1993); Shapiro, Diet Pill Litigation–Dying to Lose Weight, 14 PLLR 35 (March 1995).

[91] Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 202 Ga. App. 245, 414 S.E.2d 658, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) &p;13093 (1991) [defendant’s motion to dismiss denied.]

Since black currant oil is food in its liquid form, encapsulated oil that was active ingredient in dietary supplement could not be considered “food additive” under Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, §201(f, s) as amended, 21 U.S.C.A. §321 (f, s). United States v. 29 Cartons *** an Article of Food (1993, CA1 Mass) 987 F2d 33.

See infra Kramer v. Showa Denko K.K. (1996, SD NY) 929 F Supp 733 at §2:12, p. 160, n. 19.

FDA has proposed 21 C.F.R. 111 to ban any dietary supplement containing 8 milligrams or more of ephedrine alkaloids per serving. Since 1993, FDA has received over 800 reports of illnesses and injuries from use of this type of product. Additionally, the regulation would require warning labels on dietary supplements containing any ephedrine alkaloids.

[92] The court denied summary judgment in favor of the supplier of the raw Fen-Phen drug compound. The drug manufacturer claimed protection under comment k to §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts barring product liability actions against drug manufacturers. The court found that the state’s supreme court had rejected comment k. The court denied defendant’s claim that it was relieved from liability under the bulk supplier defense, suggesting that it was a supplier of a raw drug to the pharmacy that then compiled it. Without expressly recognizing the bulk supplier defense, the court rejected the drug manufacturer’s claim of summary judgment. Fisher v. Professional Compounding Centers of America, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 1008, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 16,967 (D.Nev. 2004).

[93] Annotations: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by medical and health supplies, appliances, and equipment, 79 ALR2d 401.

Liability of hospital or medical practitioner under doctrine of strict liability in tort, or breach of warranty, for harm caused by drug, medical instrument, or similar device used in treating patient, 54 ALR3d 258.

Medical devices regulated by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may not be further regulated by the states. King v. Collagen Corp. (1993, CA1 Mass) 983 F2d 1130, 21 UCCRS2d 568, cert den 510 US 824, 126 L Ed 2d 52, 114 S Ct 84. If the FDA has regulated a medical device, the <sst ref.id=”I03KQWX”>Federal Medical Devices Act (MDA) bars additional state regulation and preempts litigation based upon said device.

When a physician implanted a defective prosthetic device in a patient’s jaw, the court held that neither the physician nor the hospital could be held strictly liable as “sellers” of a defective device under Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A. Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Servs. (1993) 430 Pa Super 480, 635 A2d 151, reh den (Jan 6, 1994) and app gr (Pa) 645 A2d 1311 and affd (Pa) 668 A2d 521.

Food and Drug Administration finalized its rule on medical device distributor reporting under the <sst ref.id=”I03KRI5″>Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990. Under the rule, medical device distributors must report deaths, serious illnesses and serious injuries related to the medical devices to the agency and manufacturers. Additionally, medical device distributors must submit reports to the manufacturers of device malfunctions that could cause death of serious injury. 58 F.R. 46514 (No. 168) codified at 21 C.F.R. pts 804 and 807.

Food and Drug Administration proposed standard for strengthening manufacturing requirements for new medical devices. See 58 F.R. 61, 952 to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 820.

Liability of hospital, physician, or other individual medical practitioner for injury or death resulting from blood transfusion, 20 ALR4th 136.

Where hemophiliac contracted the AIDS virus from contaminated blood, Hawaii recognized market share liability for contaminated blood products. Smith v. Cutter Biological (1991) 72 Hawaii 416, 823 P2d 717, reconsideration den 72 Hawaii 616, 827 P2d 1148 and ans conformed to, remanded (CA9 Hawaii) 971 F2d 375, 92 CDOS 6559, 92 Daily Journal DAR 10504, 36 Fed Rules Evid Serv 187.

Negligence action against a blood bank accrued at the time of the contaminated blood transfusion. Smith v. Paslode Corp. (1993, CA8 Mo) 7 F3d 116, summary judgment gr, claim dismissed, on remand sub nom Smith v. American Red Cross (ED Mo) 886 F Supp 1494.

Woman who received HIV-contaminated blood through an American Red Cross (ARC) blood donor program sued the ARC for negligence. The court found that the ARC was not a part of the federal government under these circumstances and hence, could not be protected by governmental immunity. Marcella v. Brandywine Hosp. (1995, CA3 Pa) 47 F3d 618, 31 FR Serv 3d 557.

Court reversed summary judgment in favor of defendant pharmaceutical company, finding defendant pharmaceutical company was not protected by the state’s blood-shield laws from a strict liability action stemming from the sale of an infected blood product. In this action, a hemophiliac child contracted Aids from a blood product produced and sold by the defendant pharmaceutical company. JKB v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co. (1996, Ind App) 660 NE2d 602, reh den (Apr 1, 1996).

See Snyder v. American Ass’n of Blood Banks (1995, App Div) 282 NJ Super 23, 659 A2d 482, affd 144 NJ 269, 676 A2d 1036, infra at §3:1, n. 15.

Illinois Supreme Court held that under the state’s blood shield laws, blood banks are held to a professional standard of care, instead of an ordinary, reasonable standard of care. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 223 Ill. Dec. 1, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996).

Court found that state statute extending the limitations period for people who contracted AIDS or HIV from contaminated blood products to file civil actions against blood was not unconstitutional. D.J.L. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 307 N.J. Super. 61, 704 A.2d 104 (Law Div. 1997).

Wrongful death action was brought against four possible blood product manufacturers for the AIDS-related death of blood recipient who received HIV infected blood. The court found that the market share theory of liability was not necessarily inapplicable. King v. Cutter Laboratories, Div. of Miles, Inc., 714 So. 2d 351, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) &p;15199 (Fla. 1998).

Product liability action against the manufacturer of a blood product accrued when the plaintiff hemophiliac discovered that he was HIV positive and that the source of his infection was the manufacturer’s blood. Berrios v. Miles, Inc., 226 Mich. App. 470, 574 N.W.2d 677 (1997).

[94] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

See also, <ntc ref.id=”I03M5VO”>Thornton, Intrauterine Devices, 22 Trial Magazine 44 (No. 11, November 1986).

[95] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

[96] Annotation: Products liability in connection with prosthesis or other products designed to be surgically implanted in patient’s body, 1 ALR4th 921.

[97] Annotation: Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in aircraft or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 97 ALR3d 627.

[98] Annotation: Products liability: industrial accidents involving conveyor belts or systems, 2 ALR4th 262.

[99] Annotation: Products liability: protective clothing and equipment, 27 ALR4th 815.

[100] Annotation: Products liability: ladders, 11 ALR4th 1118.

[101] Annotation: Products liability: cranes and other lifting apparatuses, 13 ALR4th 476.

[102] Annotations: Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 63 ALR3d 893.

Liability for injury caused by fall of person into shaft, or by abrupt drop, sudden movement, or stopping between floors of automatic elevator, 64 ALR3d 950.

Liability of installer or maintenance company for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 64 ALR3d 1005.

Products liability: elevators, 7 ALR4th 852.

[103] Plaintiff who was injured when automatic doors at defendant’s place of business prematurely closed on her sued defendant for negligence. Lower court erroneously granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The fact that defendant did not know of the defect and the fact that there was no suggestion that there existed a defect prior to the accident, do not satisfy the defendant’s burden of proving that the plaintiff “has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element” of her case. Tarara v. Dayton Hudson Corp. (1994) 36 Mass App 942, 629 NE2d 1352, summary op at (Mass App) 22 MLW 1534 and review den 418 Mass 1103, 636 NE2d 279.

[104] In East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda (1990, Dist Col App) 578 A2d 1113, CCH Prod Liab Rep &p;12568, a mechanic was partially blinded when a vehicle battery exploded. The jury found that the warning on the battery did not adequately warn of the danger of the battery exploding during charging.

[105] Landlord’s failure to disclose to childless tenants the possibility of the presence of lead paint was not a violation of the <sst ref.id=”I03NLV7″>Consumer Protection Act, Mass Gen L Ann, ch 93A, when there was no evidence that the landlord knew of the presence of lead paint at the time the tenants leased the apartment. Underwood v. Risman (1993) 414 Mass 96, 605 NE2d 832, 19 ALR5th 964.

Plaintiff who was allegedly exposed to lead paint as a child was denied recovery against the manufacturers of the white lead used in lead paint under the market-share or concert-in-action theories. Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co. (1993, CA1 Mass) 3 F3d 546, summary op at (CA1 Mass) 22 MLW 4; see, §9:20, infra (for extended discussion of court’s analysis.)

[106] Annotation: Products liability: defective heating equipment, 1 ALR4th 748.

[107] See Andrus v. Gas Co. of New Mexico, Div. of Public Service Co. (1990, App) 110 NM 593, 798 P2d 194 [carbon monoxide poisoning caused by improper placement of a door on residential furnace and failure to properly test for carbon monoxide after lighting of pilot light.]

[108] Annotation: Products liability: firefighting equipment, 19 ALR4th 326.

[109] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[110] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[111] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[112] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[113] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[114] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[115] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[116] Annotation: Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 ALR4th 854.

[117] Annotation: Products liability: firearms, ammunition, and chemical weapons, 15 ALR4th 909.

[118] Consult infra §9:8 discussing product-related military injuries.

[119] Annotation: Products liability: farm machinery, 4 ALR4th 13.

See also, <ntc ref.id=”I03P939″>Broder, A.J., Farm Machinery Injuries: Plaintiff’s Bar Underestimates Extent of Products Liability Cases, 24 Trial Magazine 27 (No. 11, November 1988).

[120] Annotation: Products liability: farm machinery, 4 ALR4th 13.

[121] Annotation: Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defect in mobile home or trailer, 81 ALR3d 421.

[122] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller of power lawnmower for injuries to user, 41 ALR3d 986.

Parents brought a product liability action against the retailer and manufacturer of a riding lawn mower after their child sustained injury while riding in open box which child’s grandparents installed on right fender of lawn mower over housing of mower blade. Erkson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1992, Mo App) 841 SW2d 207. Court held that using mower as “motorized baby buggy” was not a reasonably foreseeable use of the product even if mower was being used to cut the grass at the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, cutting the grass was an incidental purpose.

[123] Annotation: Liability of manufacturer or seller of power lawnmower for injuries to user, 41 ALR3d 986.

Moe v. MTD Prods. (1995, CA8 Minn) 73 F3d 179 (the court found the <sst ref.id=”I03QE69″>Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §2051, does not preempt a state law claim that a lawn mower was defectively designed without a safety device.)

More than 8,000 children under the age of 14 sustain lawnmower injuries annually. Child 72 (August 1996).

[124] Annotations: Liability for injury or damage caused by operation of power machine in snow removal, 81 ALR2d 519.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of snowthrower for injuries to users, 2 ALR4th 1284.

[125] Annotations: Liability for injury or damage caused by operation of power machine in snow removal, 81 ALR2d 519.

Liability of manufacturer or seller of snowthrower for injuries to users, 2 ALR4th 1284.

[126] Annotation: Products liability: mechanical or chain saw or components thereof, 22 ALR4th 206.

[127] Annotations: Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death allegedly caused by use of contraceptive, 70 ALR3d 315.

Products liability: toxic shock syndrome, 59 ALR4th 50.

A state claim for damages arising from toxic shock syndrome based on a failure to warn if the tampon warning label required by the federal Food and Drug Administration was not present would not be preempted by federal law, but where the federally required warnings were on the tampon package, and there was no allegation of misrepresentation by the manufacturer, then summary judgment in favor of the tampon manufacturer must be granted. Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc. (1991, Ga) 399 SE2d 208, corrected 260 Ga 850, 412 SE2d 526.

Court found the Medical Device Amendments did not preempt a design defect claim against tampon manufacturer. Reece v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 90 Wash. App. 574, 953 P.2d 117, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) &p;15237 (Div. 2 1998), review denied, 136 Wash. 2d 1018, 966 P.2d 1277 (1998). See §§9:7, and 10:17.3, discussing defective medical devices and their regulations.

See also, <ntc ref.id=”I03QNW0″>Hutton, M.B., Hanna, B.A., Tierno, P.J. and Pickett, W.H., Tampons and Toxic Shock Syndrome, 24 Trial Magazine 54 (No. 2, February 1988).

[128] Court held that an exercise machine need not be in use at the time of injury for the machine’s manufacturer to be held liable for design defect. The court continued that the appropriate test to assess the claim would be a risk-utility analysis. Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 268 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001).

About the Author: James Swartz
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Mr. Swartz, our Managing and Principal Attorney at Swartz & Swartz P.C., is a nationally recognized and respected trial attorney as well as consumer advocate. His practice focuses on cases involving negligence, torts, products liability, medical malpractice, wrongful death, and other claims involving catastrophic injuries.

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